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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Once a court decides to grant specific performance, there re-
mains one other problem-the proper scope of the remedy. In Ring-
ling and Galler the Court of Chancery went no further than simply
indicating that specific performance was proper. Weil did not stop
at this but actually directed shareholders to vote in a certain man-
ner to carry out the agreement. Such broad instructions may seem
to be an over-extension of the principles of specific performance
since courts will not normally direct the manner in which share-
holders are to vote their stock. 3 The instant case, however, only
represents the natural extension of all cases indicating that share-
holder voting agreements are specifically enforceable. The voting
directions given by the court did not require anything other than
that which would have been necessary under a simple decree of
specific performance. Further, by indicating the exact method for
performing the agreement, additional litigation may be avoided.
Weil, by specifically enforcing the agreement extended the func-
tional advantages of partnership management to the corporation, but
was unable to simultaneously provide, as does partnership law, a
method of free dissolution. The two goals are incompatible. The
pragmatic solution is to recognize that partnership law cannot, and
perhaps should not, be carried over in its entirety into the close
corporations. Each decision must be based on a factual analysis of
the case, and not on inflexible rules of law. Specific enforceability
of shareholder voting agreements must ultimately be a question of
judicial discretion.
JAmES NATHAN DUGGINS, JR.
Criminal Law-Psychiatric Examination of Prosecutrix in Rape Case
Most jurisdictions follow the common law rule that a defendant
charged with rape may be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated
intermediate court held that the agreement was in disregard of the Corpora-
tion Act, and reversed a trial court decision granting specific performance.
The supreme court remanded the case indicating specific performance should
be granted.
" Courts of equity do not usually direct shareholders on how to vote
their stock. "Equity can give such relief as is proper to its practice and
procedure, and cannot give voting directions... ." 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS § 2070, at 299 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952). Equity does not
have unlimited jurisdiction, and may exercise only supervising and regula-
tive power where there is a controlling statute. Thus equity cannot give
voting directions to shareholders of a company chartered under a state
statute. People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923).
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testimony of the prosecutrix.' However, if the complainant wom-
an's testimony is incredible, contradictory, or improbable, an accusa-
tion cannot stand, unless corroborated, even in jurisdictions applying
the common law rule.2 Other jurisdictions by statutes or by judicial
decision4 have rejected the common law rule and always require
evidence from some source other than the testimony of the prose-
cutrix to corroborate her story.
Since a rape accusation is "easily made, hard to be proved, and
still harder to be disproved by one ever so innocent,"5 it has been
concluded that neither rule is adequate to protect innocent defen-
dants from convictions leading to lengthy incarceration or death.'
A proposed alternative is to require the prosecutrix to submit to a
pre-trial psychiatric examination by qualified physicians to deter-
mine whether she suffers from some mental or emotional disorder
which could affect her veracity.
7
'E.g., State v. Haston, 64 Ariz. 72, 166 P.2d 141 (1946); Bailey v.
State, 227 Ark. 889, 302 S.W.2d 76 (1957); People v. Brown, 100 Cal.
App. 2d 207, 223 P.2d 60 (1950); Johnson v. State, 118 So. 2d 806 (Fla.
Dis. Ct. App. 1960); People v. Mack, 25 Ill. App. 2d 416, 185 N.E.2d 154
(1962); State v. Toth, 214 Minn. 147, 7 N.W.2d 322 (1943). Although
no case can be found directly in point, North Carolina appears to stand with
the majority. See State v. Hooper, 186 N.C. 405, 414, 119 S.E. 769, 774(1923) (Clark, C.J., concurring). See generally 75 C.J.S. Rape § 78 (1952).
'E.g., Alvarado v. State, 63 Ariz. 511, 164 '.P.2d 460 (1945); Adams v.
Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1953); Crump v. State, 97 Okla.
Crim. 59, 257 P.2d 1103 (1953); Commonwealth v. Oyler, 130 Pa. Super.
405, 197 Atl. 508 (1938); Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 86
S.E.2d 828 (1955); Cleaveland v. State, 211 Wis. 565, 248 N.W. 408 (1933).
'GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1304 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (1950);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2360 (1957). N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2013 (1944), reads
"No conviction can be had for rape or defilement upon the testimony of the
female defiled, unsupported by other evidence."
" Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 776 (1943); Boling v. State, 91 Neb. 599, 136 N.W. 1978 (1912).
See also State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50, 187 P.2d 976 (1947).
'This is the classic statement by Lord Hale, quoted in State v. Wulif,
194 Minn. 271, 274, 260 N.W. 515, 516 (1935).
'See, e.g., 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940); Note, 1957
ILL. L. FORUM 651; Note, 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1951). See also Conrad, Psy-
chiatric Lie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199 (1958); Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions
as to the Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CAL. L. REv.
648 (1960); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950).
' See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore
would require the examination in every case. He says, "No judge should
ever let a sex-offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's
social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a
qualified physician." Ibid. (Emphasis omitted.) No court has reached this
result. One case, Burton v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953),
approached this position but was later overruled by Wedmore v. State, 237
19661
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Courts in three recent cases have considered the propriety of
such examinations. In Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego
County,' the trial court denied the defendant's motion for the court
to order a psychiatric examination. The district court of appeal
affirmed, holding that California courts did not have the power to
order the examination.' The supreme court affirmed the denial of
the order but modified the holding of the lower court by saying that
the trial judge has the discretion "to order a psychiatric examina-
tion if the circumstances indicate a necessity. . ... ,'o In State v.
Walgraeve," the Oregon Supreme Court followed the lower court
opinion in Ballard. Weighing the reasoning of the California Su-
preme Court against that of the district court of appeal, the Oregon
court felt that the latter was "less frought with dangerous poten-
tial."'" In still another case, United States v. Dildy,'3 the District
Court for the District of Columbia refused to order the examina-
tion. This court stated that it lacked the power under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure; and if it had this power, the examina-
tion would be ordered only in its discretion. 14
In arriving at their different conclusions, the courts considered
four factors that deserve mention and analysis. The first of these
is the requirement of corroboration for conviction. In California a
defendant charged with rape can be convicted upon uncorroborated
testimony of the prosecutrix.' 5 The District of Columbia requires
corroboration.' 6 No doubt this was a determining factor in both
cases. The Ballard court stated:
necessity for the examination would generally arise only if little
or no corroboration supported the charge and if the defense
raised the issue of the effect of the complaining witness' mental
or emotional condition upon her veracity. 17
Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957). See also Warren v. State, 238 Ind. 401,
151 N.E.2d 149 (1958).
'49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 (1966).
'Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 44 Cal. Rptr. 291
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
1049 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313, 410 P.2d 838, 849.
11412 P.2d 23, petition for rehearing denied, 413 P.2d 609 (Ore. 1966).
12413 P.2d 609.
39 F.R.D. 340 (D.D.C. 1966).
1 Id. at 342-43.
See People v. Murray, 91 Cal. App. 2d 253, 204 P.2d 624 (1949).
16 See Wilson v. U.S., 271 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
17 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313, 410 P.2d at 849.
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In contrast, the Dildy court stated:
thus we have two principles. One ... requires corroboration of
the prosecutrix.... The second would require a psychiatric ex-
amination of an uncorroborated prosecutrix.... It would appear
that these two principles are, to a large degree, mutually exclu-
sive.1 8
The Dildy court would be correct if the rule requiring corrobo-
ration provided adequate safeguards; i.e., if the evidence were re-
quired to substantiate the commission of the offense and link the
defendant thereto. In reality, however, some courts are content to
use any shred of evidence to "corroborate" the prosecutrix, without
regard to probative value. For example, in State v. Scott 9 the fact
that the defendant had registered in a hotel with the prosecutrix
was sufficient to corroborate her story. And in Fox v. Common-
wealtht,20 corroboration was found in that the defendant's accomplice
and the prosecutrix were infected by'gonorrhea even though the
defendant was found free of the disease. These cases are illustra-
tive of instances where the rule requiring corroboration is inade-
quate because the courts are groping to fulfill the corroborative need
in a mechanical fashion. If in cases like Scott and Fox the courts
could use psychiatric examinations as a compliment to the corrobo-
rating evidence, they could avoid the dilemma of either dismissing
the case altogether or convicting on somewhat strained evidence.
Another essential consideration was whether a requirement for
the examination would deter complainants from speaking out and
bringing their assailants to justice. The court in Dildy said:
the liberty of the prosecutrix must also be weightd. The prose-
cutrix . . . is already forced to undergo formidible and oftimes
embarrasing formalities.... Publicity thrives on such cases....
Intimidating and indelicate procedural probings tend to induce
to silence all but the most hardened victims. 21
This deterrent effect seems a legitimate consideration, but it may
have been overemphasized since it is generally held that courts have
1839 F.R.D. at 344.
20 Wash. 2d 696, 149 P.2d 152 (1944).
20299 Ky. 293, 185 S.W.2d 394 (1945).
21 39 F.R.D. at 343. The BaUard court also recognized the possible de-
terrent effect but apparently felt that only an absolute requirement for the
examination in every case would have serious consequences in this respect.
See 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313, 410 P.2d at 849.
1966]
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the power to order a physical examination of the prosecutrix.22 In
fact, the Walgraeve court in a companion case held that there are
circumstances in which a physical examination could be ordered if
a specific purpose can be served.23 The position, then, of this court
is that a physical examniation would not have the deterrent effect
of a psychiatric one. This seems quite inconsistent since a physical
examination would be characterized by an actual invasion of the
person while a psychiatric inquiry would be more remote. Thus, it
seems that a physical invasion would deter prospective witnesses at
least as much as a mental examination.
Another reason why the deterrent effect may have been over-
emphasized is that some jurisdictions require by statute that the
identity of the prosecutrix must not be divulged by the news media
in order to shield her from publicity.24 A violation could lead to
criminal' or civil2" liability. Although few Jurisdictions have these
provisions, it has been pointed out that news media usually volun-
tarily refrain from revealing her name.27 The defendant, however,
is not afforded this protection with the result that public emotion
calls for his conviction.2" His conviction should rest on evidence,
not emotion. The goals of finding the truth and achieving a fair
trial seem to outweigh any possible deterrent effect if the examina-
tion is used only in cases of little or no corroboration.
Each of the three courts felt that if the prosecutrix voluntarily
submitted to the examination, the results would be admissible. 9
This position is suported by other authority and indicates some faith
in modern psychiatry.30 But the court in Walgraeve felt that the
results of an examination of an unwilling prosecutrix would be
"People v. Kemp, 139 Cal. App. 48, 34 P.2d 502 (1934); State v.
Pucca, 20 Del. 71, 55 Atl. 831 (1902); People v. Porcaro, 6 N.Y.2d 248,
160 N.E.2d 488, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1959) ; Walker v. State, 12 Okla. Crim.
179, 152 Pac. 209 (1915). See also McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147, 7 So.
35 (1889).
22 State v. Cook, 411 P.2d 78 (Ore. 1966).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2105 (1935)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-81 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (1958).
25 State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
-Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1963).
'T Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1950).
2 26 IND. L.J. 98, 100 (1951). See Roberts v. State, 106 Neb. 362, 183
N.W. 555 (1921).20 39 F.R.D. at 342; 44 Cal. Rptr. at 293; 412 P.2d at 24.
"
0E.g., Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697 (1928).
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questionable at best."1 Also the Ballard court realistically noted that
an unwilling prosecutrix could not be forced to cooperate and in-
ferred that the results would not be credible evidence.3 2 Apparently
to encourage cooperation, Ballard ruled that a comment to the jury
on the refusal to cooperate would be allowed.3 3 Perhaps a better
means of encouraging cooperation would be to allow the psychi-
atrists to observe her at trial and then to testify as to her credibility.
This latter method is suggested only as an alternative and should
normally not be implemented because most psychiatrists feel a satis-
factory opinion can be formed only after a clinical examination."4
Another determination was whether the courts had the power
to order the examination. Dildy noted that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure3  provide for a mental examination of a party on
good cause shown. The court therefore felt that the absence of any
parallel provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indi-
cated an intended omission, particularly in "light of the hard fought
battle to sustain the power to order the examination" 6 under the
31412 P.2d at 24.
3249 Cal. Rptr. at 313, 410 P.2d at 849.
33 Ibid.
,McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE 100 (1954). See People v. Cowles, 246 Mich.
429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929), wherein physicians were allowed to testify as
to the credibility of the prosecutrix, apparently after observing her at trial.
See also United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 185
F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951), where a psychiatrist,
without the aid of a clinical examination, testified that the prosecuting
witness was suffering from a disorder known as "psychopathic personality."
Conrad, supra note 6, at 205. Later, the psychiatrist admitted that he had
made a wrong diagnosis. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1950, p. 12, col. 4, cited in
30 NEB. L. REv. 513, 517 n.17 (1951).
Other problems may still arise. One such problem is that of communica-
tion between the psychiatrist and the jury. The term "psychopathic per-
sonality" is said to be basically meaningless and is really a catch-all label
given to various mental disorders which fall between the psychotic and the
feebleminded. Arieff & Rotman, Psychopathic Personality, 39 J. CRim. L.,
C. & P.S. 158 (1948). Consequently, it has been suggested that these im-
pressive but meaningless terms are of no aid to the jury and that the testi-
mony should be concerned with what mental conditions are likely to affect
and which do affect the witness' truthfulness. See Juviler, supra note 6, at
657. Even if all the technical problems are corrected, there still exists the
problem of the reliability of the evidence for psychiatrists cannot determine
in every case the existence of personality disorders which affect the veracity
of the witness. 39 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 750, 753 (1949). However, expert
opinion based upon the science of psychiatry apears far better than guess-
work based upon ignorance. See OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE
LAW (1953).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
36 39 F.R.D. at 342. On the contrary, the Ballard court felt that it had
the power to allow trial courts this authority because it had traditionally
19661
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Civil Rules. It is clear that Dildy limits the power of the court to
order a pre-trial examination. However, had the defendant moved
for the examination at trial when the prosecutrix was offered as a
witness, the result might have been different. In fact, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has indicated that a witness
may be ordered, in the discretion of the court, to submit to a mental
examination if the defendant moves for the examination at trial
when the witness is presented to testify. 7 This distinction apparent-
ly arises because some courts feel there is a lack of jurisdiction over
a prospective witness until he is presented at trial. Dildy made no
mention of what the court's position would have been had the defen-
dant moved for the examination when the prosecutrix was offered
as a witness. The Walgraeve court also indicated a lack of power
to order the examination by calling on the legislature to enact
changes, if necessary, in the present policy.3 8 Here again an apparent
inconsistency arises in the position of the Walgraeve court because
in another case it stated that a physical examination could be ordered
under the proper circumstances. 9 If a court has the power to order
a psysical examination without legislative approval, it would seem
that the same reasoning would give the court the power to order
a psychiatric one.
In viewing each of the three cases in the light of their treatment
of the aforementioned factors, it would appear that Ballard has
achieved the best result. Ballard adopted neither "an absolute pro-
hibition nor an absolute requirement that the prosecutrix submit to
a psychiatric examination."4 Its position is midway between the
polar extremes, thus giving a flexibility which should not hamper
the administration of justice from either the state's or defendant's
point of view.
TommY W. JARRETT
developed the rules of criminal discovery in absence of ctatute. 49 Cal.
Rptr. at 313, 410 P.2d at 849 n.12. See also State v. Butler, 27 N.J.L. 560,
143 A.2d 530 (1958) (failure to order the pre-trial psychiatric examination
of prosecuting witness in murder case held to be abuse of discretion).
Carrado v. United States, 210 F.2d 712, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Otherjurisdictions make this distinction. See Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619,
116 A.2d 433 (1955); Commonwealth v. Melnicoff, 32 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1938).
At least one court has held that it has no jurisdiction over the witness
after he leaves the stand. Goodwin v. State, 114 Wis. 318, 90 N.W. 170(1902).
'8412 P.2d at 24.
State v. Cook, 411 P.2d 78 (Ore. 1966).
4049 Cal. Rptr. at 313, 410 P.2d at 849.
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